Wittgenstein's private language

why pain only?

why pain for the similarity between humans and animals? (L'animalite--the hybrid community)

why does Woolf's English fail for her pain? physical? emotional? corporeal? mental? spiritual in memory? or whatever? 

why pain and sympathy?-- diverse discussions for the (im)possibility  

why is pain linked with private language?

why private language impossible?

is "authentic" pain plausible or possible?

is the personal pain identical with suffering (or sorrow) in tragedy?

should pain accompany perception (for ethics) what if it is invisible? what if it is just imaginary? what if it is closer to a fantasy like Ivan's example?

"there are no bound to the sympathetic imagination"... aesthetically and ?

Montaigne's cat and the limit of intelligence.




25. It is sometimes said: animals do not talk because they lack the mental abilities. And this means: “They do not think, and that is why they do not talk.” But—they simply do not talk. Or better: they do not use language—if we disregard the most primitive forms of language.—Giving orders, asking questions, telling stories, having a chat, are as much a part of our natural history as walking, eating, drinking, playing. (16 e)



283. Only of what behaves like a human being can one say that it has pains.  



293. If I say of myself that it is only from my own case that I know what the word “pain” means—must I not say that of other people too? How can I generalize the one case so irresponsibly? Well, everyone tells me that he knows what pain is only from his own case! –Suppose that everyone had a box with something in it which we call a “beetle.” No one can ever look into anyone else’s box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle.  – Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box. One might even imagine such a thing constantly changing.— But what if these people’s word “beetle” had a use nonetheless? –If so, it would not be so as the name of a thing. The thing in the box doesn’t belong to the language-game at all; not even as a Something: for the box might even be empty. –No, one can ‘divide through’ by the thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is. That is to say, if we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of ‘object and name,’ the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant. (106e-107e)



Montaigne's Essays: "When I play with my cat, how do I know that she is not passing time with me rather than I with her?" 



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